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65 
WHEN FREEDOM PREVENTS 
VINDICATION: WHY THE HECK RULE 
SHOULD NOT BAR A PRISONER’S § 1983 
ACTION IN DEEMER v. BEARD 
Abstract: In 2014, in Deemer v. Beard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that the Heck v. Humphrey rule required all plaintiffs seeking dam-
ages for unconstitutional conviction under § 1983 to demonstrate that the crimi-
nal proceeding in question terminated in their favor. This decision defies a ma-
jority of circuit courts, which have held that there exists an exception to Heck if 
the plaintiff does not have other federal means of redress. In its decision, the 
Third Circuit aligned itself with three other appellate courts that did not take a 
plaintiff’s lack of access to other means of federal relief into consideration. Alt-
hough these circuit courts have correctly adhered to binding U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, doing so places an unfair burden upon a plaintiff’s ability to 
challenge an unconstitutional conviction. This Comment contends that the U.S. 
Supreme Court should settle the Heck circuit split and allow such an exception 
to the Heck rule to meet the underlying principles of § 1983. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff can bring a claim against the state 
for the unconstitutional deprivation of rights.1 Plaintiffs can challenge a con-
viction or sentence by using § 1983 to hold state actors accountable in a fed-
eral forum for violating federally protected rights.2 Although the U.S. Su-
preme Court has often interpreted the language of § 1983 broadly, it has also 
set limitations on this cause of action in specific situations.3 In 1994, in Heck 
v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court created a favorable termination re-
quirement to restrict the ability of convicted plaintiffs to challenge their in-
carceration using § 1983, known as “the Heck rule.”4 This decision prevented 
                                                                                                                           
 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480, 502 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). Section 1983 
protects inmates against unconstitutional treatment. Id. at 480. By providing a federal forum, 
§ 1983 removes possible state court bias when a plaintiff is challenging the actions of the state. 
See id. at 501 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 3 Id. at 486–87 (majority opinion) (placing a favorable termination restriction on § 1983 alleg-
ing unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment); id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)) (referring to § 1983 as a “general” and expansive 
statute). 
 4 Id. at 489 (majority opinion); see id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring). To achieve a favorable 
termination, the plaintiff’s challenged conviction must have been “reversed on direct appeal, ex-
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certain plaintiffs from the possibility of a federal remedy against state actors 
for an infringement of constitutional rights.5 Thus, § 1983 became unavaila-
ble to the individuals it was intended to protect.6 
In 2014, in Deemer v. Beard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit applied the Heck rule to a plaintiff who had exhausted his options for 
state and federal remedy because his release rendered those avenues moot.7 
Although the Third Circuit and three other circuit courts have maintained this 
approach, the other seven circuit courts have held that Heck does not apply 
when a plaintiff has exhausted his options and has no other forum for re-
course.8 
This Comment argues that, although the Supreme Court has denied re-
viewing Deemer, it must resolve the circuit split soon and allow an exception 
to the Heck rule because it is a denial of constitutional rights to impose the 
Heck rule on prisoners who do not have another forum to seek redress 
through no fault of their own.9 Part I of this Comment details the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
punged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determina-
tion, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486–87 
(majority opinion). Essentially the plaintiff must show that, in some previous manner, his convic-
tion was erroneous. See id. at 487. 
 5 Id. at 489. 
 6 See id. at 500–01 (Souter, J. concurring) (stating that insulating federal courts from claims 
that clearly fall under § 1983 defeats to the statute’s purpose); see also Cohen v. Longshore, 621 
F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2010) (“If a petitioner is unable to obtain habeas relief—at least 
where this inability is not due to the petitioner’s own lack of diligence—it would be unjust to 
place his claim for relief beyond the scope of § 1983 where ‘exactly the same claim could be re-
dressed if brought by a former prisoner who had succeeded in cutting his custody short through 
habeas.’” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring))); Wilson v. 
Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he sweeping breadth, ‘high purposes,’ and 
‘unique[ness]’ of § 1983 would be compromised in an unprincipled manner if it could not be ap-
plied here.” (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985))). 
 7 Deemer v. Beard (Deemer II), 557 F. App’x 162, 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 50 (2014). The plaintiff’s state court appeals and habeas corpus claim were rendered moot 
due to his release from prison. Id. at 164. The court held that he could not seek damages by alleging 
an unconstitutional prolonging of his confinement under § 1983 because his conviction had not been 
previously overturned. See id. at 163. 
 8 Id. at 165, 166 (determining the Heck rule applied universally and rejecting the exception 
adopted by seven other circuit courts). The First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have applied the 
Heck rule even if the plaintiff cannot bring a habeas corpus claim. See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 
998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2005); Randell v. John-
son, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80, 81 n.3 
(1st Cir. 1998). The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
allowed for an exception to Heck when the plaintiff had no other federal forum. See Burd v. Sess-
ler, 702 F.3d 429, 435 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012); Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316; Wilson, 535 F.3d at 267–68; 
Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 2007); Harden v. 
Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2003); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 
2002); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 9 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489; id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring); infra notes 15–85 and accom-
panying text; see also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 167 (Rendell, J., concurring) (“I believe that the 
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Court’s decision in Heck and reviews the facts and procedural history of 
Deemer.10 Part II discusses the circuit split and the rationale used by different 
circuit courts to justify their decision to apply or not apply the Heck rule to 
released inmates.11 Lastly, Part III argues that the even though the Court de-
clined to review the Third Circuit’s ruling in Deemer, it should address the 
issues Deemer raises soon because, in the interim, circuit courts are bound by 
binding precedent that goes against the goals of § 1983.12 This will prevent 
further infringement upon the very rights § 1983 protects and stop circuit 
courts from undermining Heck on its behalf.13 
I. THE HECK RULE AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO INMATES SEEKING  
SECTION 1983 DAMAGES 
Lower courts have struggled on whether or not the Heck rule applies if a 
plaintiff has no other recourse for relief.14 Section A of Part I addresses the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck and the impact of restricting plaintiffs 
from using §1983 to recover damages for unconstitutional convictions.15 Sec-
tion B of Part I addresses how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
applied the Heck rule in Deemer.16 
A. The Heck Rule Requires Plaintiffs to Show a Favorable Termination on 
Their Conviction to Have a Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, in order for a plaintiff to bring a 
damages claim for an unconstitutional conviction under § 1983, the sentence 
needs to be “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called 
                                                                                                                           
principles that animated the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heck should lead to a different result, 
were the court to consider the issue anew in the fact pattern before us.”). The Heck rule should not 
apply when plaintiffs have appropriately sought state or federal relief but are denied those oppor-
tunities as a result of their release. See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 168 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
Liberty is a fundamental concept in the U.S. Constitution. See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl. (out-
lining the fundamental ideas protected by the United States Constitution). Prisoners often chal-
lenge their imprisonment by claiming that they were deprived of due process rights as well as 
other constitutional protections. See, e.g., Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 164 (concerning Deemer’s 
contentions that the state violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights); Gilles, 427 F.3d 
at 203 (concerning Gilles’s contentions that the state violated his First Amendment rights). 
 10 See infra notes 14–43 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 45–67 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 25–43 and accompanying text (describing how the Third Circuit dealt with 
the issue in Deemer); see also infra notes 47–67 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit 
split in interpretation of the Heck rule). 
 15 See infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 25–43 and accompanying text. 
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into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”17 Ac-
cordingly, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim if the sentence has not been 
nullified favorably in one of the aforementioned circumstances.18 
To reach this conclusion, the Court examined the required elements in 
malicious prosecution actions, which it considered the closest equivalent to 
an unconstitutional conviction claim.19 To avoid parallel litigation, plaintiffs 
in malicious prosecution suits must show that the criminal proceeding under 
review ended in their favor.20 This favorable termination requirement pre-
vents plaintiffs from using a civil suit to make a “collateral attack” against his 
sentence.21 Thus, applying this reasoning, the Supreme Court established the 
Heck rule: courts were required to dismiss a § 1983 cause of action for dam-
ages unless the plaintiff’s sentence was previously invalidated.22 This applied 
even to a plaintiff that had used every possible avenue of state and federal 
                                                                                                                           
 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Bur-
dens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 320–21 
(2010) (“Section 1983 provides a cause of action to persons claiming that one acting under color 
of state law violated their constitutional rights.”). A prisoner has a federal forum to challenge a 
conviction through a writ of habeas corpus. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014) 
(“A writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal . . . .”); see also Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Un-
forgivable: Reinvigorating the Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751, 
770 (2013) (citing Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 872, 
872–73 (2008)) (describing a writ of habeas corpus). 
 18 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. 
 19 Id. at 483, 484 (citing Memphis Comty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)) 
(“[U]nlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, [malicious prosecution] 
permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.”). 
 20 Id. at 484 (citing Carpenter v. Nutter, 59 P. 301 (Cal. 1899)); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 874 (5th ed. 1984)); 8 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24 (1991). If an individual brought a civil suit against the 
state while defending a criminal case, this would constitute parallel litigation. Heck, 512 U.S. at 
484. The civil and criminal court would both be determining probable cause and guilt. Id. This 
created the possibility of contradictory results where an individual won the civil case and received 
damages despite being convicted in the criminal case. See id. 
 21 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (citing SPEISER ET AL., supra note 20, § 28:5, at 24) (regarding a 
criminal defendant’s ability to use a civil suit to attack his criminal prosecution). A collateral at-
tack is an attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal. BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 17, at 318.  
 22 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he district court must consider whether a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the 
complaint must be dismissed . . . .”). 
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resolution.23 The Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Spencer v. Kemna ques-
tioned this expansive reach in several concurring and dissenting opinions.24 
B. The Third Circuit’s Application of the Heck Rule in Deemer v. Beard 
James Deemer brought suit pursuant to § 1983 against the former secre-
tary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and other individuals 
involved in prolonging his incarceration.25 He alleged his imprisonment was 
extended for a year and a day beyond the expiration of his sentence.26 
In 2007, Deemer was granted parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Pro-
bation and Parole (“Parole Board”).27 A few months later, he was arrested and 
charged in New Jersey for a separate drug violation that was eventually dis-
missed.28 Following his return to Pennsylvania, the Parole Board gave Deem-
er the maximum sentence on his conviction by adding on the days he did not 
serve before his parole release.29 Deemer appealed the decision, arguing that 
his incarceration in New Jersey should be credited towards his remaining sen-
tence.30 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania dismissed Deemer’s ap-
peal because it was still pending after his release in June 2010.31 Deemer had 
also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Schuylkill County Court of 
Common Pleas, which similarly became moot once his sentence ended.32 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 489. Justice Scalia emphasized the expansiveness of the Heck rule by refuting Justice 
Souter’s concurrence that the Heck rule should not be applicable to released convicts that had no 
habeas corpus rights. See id. at 490 n.10. 
24 See, e.g., 523 U.S. at 20–21 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating the need to limit the Heck 
rule’s application for prisoners without habeas corpus access); id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring) (same); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 25 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 164. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Id. at 163. Deemer had a two-to-six year sentence. Id. At the time of his release on parole, 
he had 489 days left on his conviction of two counts of retail theft. Id. A condition of Deemer’s 
parole, which he violated subsequently, required his enrollment in a drug treatment program. Id. 
After Deemer violated his parole, the Parole Board issued a warrant for his arrest. Id. 
 28 Id.; Complaint at 3–4, Deemer v. Beard (Deemer I), No. 1:CV-12-1143, 2013 WL 1149307 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013), aff’d, 557 F. App’x 162 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 50 (2014). 
Deemer was incarcerated in the Warren County prison in New Jersey for 366 days before he was 
transferred back to Pennsylvania. Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 163. The Parole Board did not take 
Deemer’s detainment in Warren County of 366 days into consideration when determining his new 
release date of June 17, 2010. Id. 
 29 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 163. 
 30 Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307, at *2. 
 31 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 164. Previously, the Parole Board had rejected Deemer’s peti-
tion for an administrative review on December 18, 2009. Id. Deemer had completed his sentence 
before his appeal on his conviction reached the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. See id. 
 32 Id.; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, 
Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307 (No. 1:12-CV-1143) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defend-
ant’s Motion to Dismiss]. 
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Following his discharge, Deemer sought monetary damages by filing a 
§ 1983 complaint against several defendants with the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.33 He contended that the Parole Board infringed upon his con-
stitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment by extending 
his sentence beyond the maximum time the court of conviction had issued.34 
The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Heck rule pre-
vented Deemer’s claim from moving forward.35 Deemer reasoned that Heck 
did not apply to his challenge because of his diligence in pursuing all other 
possible avenues of relief before finally resorting to filing suit against defend-
ants.36 The district court did not find Deemer’s response persuasive.37 It cited 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Con-
sovoy in 2006 as precedent to apply the Heck rule even if Deemer had no oth-
er forum for remedy due to the mootness of his case.38 
In Deemer’s appeal to the Third Circuit, the court upheld the existing 
precedent it set in Williams and affirmed the district court’s decision.39 The 
court reiterated its stance that the Heck rule applied equally in all § 1983 
claims, even to plaintiffs who do not have a habeas corpus remedy.40 
Although the concurrences and dissent in Spencer challenged the use of 
the Heck rule in this situation, they did not sway the Third Circuit’s interpre-
                                                                                                                           
 33 Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307, at *1. His suit named several officials and employees of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and members and officers of the Parole Board. Id. 
 34 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 164; see U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV. Deemer insisted that 
the 366 days he spent detained in New Jersey should be counted towards his sentence. See Deemer 
II, 557 F. App’x at 164. In addition to an infringement of rights under the U.S. Constitution, 
Deemer also alleged the Parole Board’s actions violated Pennsylvania law. Id. 
 35 See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307 (No. 1:CV-
12-1143) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87) (stating that Deemer’s conviction has not “been ex-
punged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determi-
nation, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus”). Defendants 
also noted that the Heck rule applies to claims regarding parole board decisions that lead to im-
proper incarcerations. Id. at 2 (citing Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 36 Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307, at *1. This included an appeal to the Parole Board, an appeal 
to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, and a petition for state habeas corpus relief. Plain-
tiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 32, at 2. The former was rejected 
and the latter two were dismissed as moot. Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 164; Plaintiff’s Opposition 
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 32, at 2 (outlining the case’s procedural history). 
 37 Deemer I, 2013 WL 1149307, at *1. 
 38 See id. at *3 (citing Williams, 453 F.3d 177–78); see also Williams, 453 F.3d at 178 (de-
clining to hold that the Heck rule did not apply to § 1983 plaintiffs who were no longer in custo-
dy). 
 39 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166; see Williams, 453 F.3d at 178. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit also cited its decision in 2005 in Gilles, which interpreted and applied the 
Heck rule in the same manner as Williams. See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166; see also Gilles, 
427 F.3d at 210 (holding that questions of habeas corpus availability does not effect the applicabil-
ity of the Heck rule). 
 40 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166. 
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tation.41 Even if the five justices in Spencer meant to establish precedent for 
reinterpreting the Heck rule, the Third Circuit rejected the idea of using a non-
majority opinion to overrule the Court’s decision in Heck.42 Deemer subse-
quently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court that was 
denied.43 
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION  
OF THE HECK RULE 
Circuits are conflicted on the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in 1994 in Heck v. Humphrey and whether there exists an exception to 
the Heck rule for plaintiffs with no other means of relief.44 Section A discuss-
es Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck and the Supreme Court’s application 
of the Heck rule in 1998 in Spencer v. Kemna.45 Section B discusses the cir-
cuit split regarding the interpretation of the Heck rule after Spencer.46 
A. Justice Souter’s Concurrence in Heck v. Humphrey and its Reemergence 
in Spencer v. Kemna 
In Spencer, the Supreme Court discussed the application of the prece-
dent it set in Heck.47 In concurring and dissenting opinions, five justices 
adopted the reasoning from Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence.48 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. (quoting Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209–10); see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 20–21 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (explaining that it’s important to interpret and restrict the majority opinion in Heck 
to prisoners without habeas corpus access); Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(same); Spencer, 523 U.S. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Souter’s view 
that the plaintiff was not barred by the Heck rule against bringing suit under § 1983). 
 42 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166. 
 43 See Deemer v. Beard (Deemer III), 135 S. Ct. 50, 50 (2014); Petition for a Writ of Certiora-
ri, Deemer II, 557 F. App’x 162 (No. 13-1153). 
44 See infra notes 47–67 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
 47 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
486–87 (1994) (establishing a favorable termination requirement for plaintiffs seeking to use § 1983 
to challenge their conviction). 
 48 See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17; id. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 500, 501 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (asserting that there should be an exception to the Heck rule if the plaintiff has no 
access to habeas corpus relief due to his release because the very purpose of § 1983 is to “inter-
pose the federal courts between the States and the people”); Deemer v. Beard (Deemer II), 557 F. 
App’x 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the potential interpretation of the Heck rule based 
upon the Spencer plurality), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 50 (2014). The plaintiff in Spencer argued that 
the Heck rule would prevent him from seeking damages under § 1983 because he did not incur a 
favorable termination of his sentence. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 19. He asserted that his habeas corpus 
claim was not moot because Heck would prevent any other avenue for federal redress against the 
state’s unconstitutional revocation of his parole. See id. 
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In Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck, he worried how Heck’s favora-
ble termination rule would apply when there is no intersection between 
§ 1983 and the habeas corpus statute.49 Those in state custody have an availa-
ble remedy through habeas corpus for due process, but those who are not in 
custody do not have the option of invoking federal habeas jurisdiction.50 
Without a writ of habeas corpus, the only way a plaintiff can challenge the 
constitutionality of their conviction in a federal forum is by bringing a cause 
of action under § 1983.51 Justice Souter suggested that the Court could not 
prevent plaintiffs that are not in state custody from bringing a claim using 
§ 1983 because it goes against the congressional intent behind the statute.52 
He concluded that the applicability of the habeas corpus statute should be an 
important consideration when determining whether Heck’s limitations on 
§ 1983 apply to the facts of a case.53 
In his concurrence in Spencer, Justice Souter once more emphasized the 
importance of limiting the application of the Heck rule to only inmates that 
are pursuing damages for unconstitutional convictions through a §1983 ac-
tion.54 Following a prisoner’s release, a moot habeas corpus claim should not 
prevent relief under § 1983.55 Overall five justices supported Justice Souter’s 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to “individuals not ‘in custody’ 
for habeas purposes” and released prisoners who are unable to bring habeas corpus claims). 
 50 See id.  
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 501 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 158 (1992)); Civil Suits for Violations of 
Civil Rights: Hearing and Markups Before the Subcomm. on Judiciary, Manpower, & Educ. and 
the Comm. on the D.C. H.R., 96th Cong. 2 (1979) (statement of Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli, Chair-
man, Subcomm. on Judiciary, Manpower, & Educ.) (“[T]he citizens of all the States of the Union 
. . . should not have to rely upon local courts for adjudication of their Constitutional grievances 
against local authorities.”). Justice Souter provided an example of a “former slave framed by Ku 
Klux Klan-controlled law-enforcement . . . and convicted by a Klan-controlled state court . . . 
[who didn’t have] proof of unconstitutionality until after his release from state custody.” Heck, 
512 U.S. at 501–02. The Heck rule would prevent him from seeking remedy via a § 1983 action 
unless he convinced a biased state court that his conviction was unlawful. See id. at 502. The un-
fair result and inability of the plaintiff to reach a federal forum is the opposite of what § 1983 
sought to achieve. See id. Justice Souter went on to posit that Congress did not intend to deny 
individuals who were fined unconstitutionally or those who discovered evidence of unconstitu-
tional state action following release from prison from accessing § 1983 protections. See id. 
 53 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 503 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I would not cast doubt on the ability of 
an individual unaffected by the habeas [corpus] statute to take advantage of the broad reach of 
§ 1983.”). 
 54 See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 20 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter further implied that this 
should be the interpretation of the majority opinion in Heck. See id. 
 55 See id. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concur-
rence reiterated that the state of the law should be in line with Justice Souter’s reasoning. Id. at 21 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Likewise, Justice John Paul Stevens supported Justice Souter’s reason-
ing that those without access to federal habeas jurisdiction should be allowed to file for damages 
using § 1983. Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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interpretation of the Heck rule in Spencer, which resulted in the circuit split 
that followed.56 
B. How Circuit Courts Interpreted the Heck Rule After the Plurality Opinion 
in Spencer v. Kemna 
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit indicated in Deemer 
v. Beard, circuit courts are split on their interpretations of the Heck decision.57 
The lack of a majority following Spencer left the question regarding the pa-
rameters of the Heck rule’s scope unresolved.58 As a result, circuit courts di-
verged in their application of Heck’s favorable termination requirement.59 
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits inter-
pret Heck in accordance with Justice Souter’s concurrence, considering the 
Spencer plurality to be informative of the Court’s ruling in Heck.60 These 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See id. at 19–21 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 25 n.8 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 165, 166 (discussing how seven 
Courts of Appeals have cited Spencer in their decision and apply Justice Souter’s interpretation 
but the four other Courts of Appeals have decided to create an exception to Heck’s favorable ter-
mination requirement). 
 57 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 165, 166; infra notes 59–67 (discussing the divergence in 
circuit interpretation of the Heck rule after the Court’s decision in Spencer). 
 58 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 165, 166. See generally Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1 (resolving 
the application of the Heck rule through a plurality opinion as opposed to a consensus between a 
majority of justices). 
 59 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x. The concurrences and dissent of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer could be synthesized together and viewed as a plurality opinion 
indicative of the Court’s intended interpretation of its Heck holding. See id. On the other hand, 
following Spencer, there has not been a majority opinion that definitively upholds the viewpoints 
in Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck leaving circuit courts uncertain on the applicability of the 
Spencer plurality. See id. at 166–67. 
 60 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489; Deemer II, at 165; see also Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435 
n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has not specified, in a majority holding, whether Heck 
applies where habeas corpus relief is unavailable, although five Justices in one opinion expressed 
their views that it should not . . . [thus, the Seventh Circuit] follow[s its] previous opinions in this 
regard.” (citation omitted)); Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2010) (opt-
ing to follow “the reasoning of the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
that [the court is] free to follow the five-Justice plurality’s approach in Spencer on this unsettled 
question of law”); Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]ith no directly 
applicable precedent upon which to rely . . . [the Fourth Circuit believes] that the reasoning em-
ployed by the plurality in Spencer must prevail . . . where an individual would be left without any 
access to federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred.”); Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender 
Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 602–03 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Casting Spencer aside is something we decline 
to do.”); Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] claim filed pursuant to 
. . . § 1983 seeking damages and declaratory relief for the violation of a state prisoner’s federally 
protected extradition rights . . . is not barred by Heck, where the specific allegations . . . [involve 
failure] to provide . . . [a] habeas corpus hearing . . . .”); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876–77 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“Informed as we are by the opinions in Spencer, we conclude that Heck does not 
preclude [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 action.”); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Spencer concurrences and dissent ‘revealed that five justices hold the view that, where federal 
74 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
courts consider their implementation of Justice Souter’s interpretation in 
Spencer as “rule refinement.”61 Spencer did not definitively limit the Heck 
rule, but Heck also did not set a binding precedent on plaintiffs without access 
to habeas corpus because it did not involve an analogous fact pattern.62 
Moreover, these courts justify following the five-justice plurality in 
Spencer by finding that Justice Souter’s interpretation was more in line with 
the principles that promulgated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.63 The circuits reason that 
an imposition of the Heck rule on inmates who were not eligible to seek ha-
beas corpus goes against Congressional intent to use § 1983 to provide plain-
tiffs with a federal remedy for unconstitutional state actions.64 
The four remaining circuit courts, including the Third Circuit in Deemer, 
interpret Heck’s favorable termination requirement as universal.65 They con-
                                                                                                                           
habeas corpus is not available to address certain constitutional wrongs, §1983 must be,’ [thus] we 
conclude that [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 claim must be allowed to proceed.” (quoting Jenkins v. Hau-
bert, 179 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 61 See, e.g., Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316 (“We are instead persuaded by the reasoning of the Sec-
ond, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that we are free to follow the five-
Justice plurality’s approach in Spencer on this unsettled question of law.”); Powers, 501 F.3d at 
601–02 (stating that sister circuits who do not apply the Spencer plurality have mistakenly equated 
“ordinary rule refinement” with ignoring precedent); Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 876, 877 (using Spen-
cer to interpret Heck because Spencer has a more analogous fact pattern with a prisoner who had 
completed his term).  
 62 See Powers, 501 F.3d at 601–02. Heck did not explicitly provide instructions on whether 
favorable termination was required for plaintiffs who could not seek habeas corpus relief due to 
their release. See id. at 603. Furthermore, Spencer was more informative on the Court’s views of 
the applicability of the Heck rule on plaintiffs who were already released from jail and could not 
seek habeas corpus remedies. See Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 876 (noting that Heck involved an incar-
cerated plaintiff whereas Spencer concerned a released plaintiff). 
 63 See Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316 (citing Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-
548, at 2 (1979) (regarding the legislature’s intent to use § 1983 to provide plaintiffs with a civil 
remedy to challenge their convictions in a federal forum). 
 64 See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268; see also Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316 (agreeing with the Fourth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Wilson that the purposes of § 1983 favored an exception to the Heck rule 
when federal habeas corpus was not available by no fault of the plaintiff). A broad reading of the 
Heck rule goes against the purposes of § 1983 by closing the possibility of a federal remedy for 
the denial of the fundamental right to liberty. See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (citing Wilson v. Gar-
cia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)). Freedom is one of the most important rights and should not be 
revoked without the ability to seek redress in federal court. See id.  
 65 Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166 (“[The Third Circuit] along with three other Courts of 
Appeals have declined to follow the concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer.”); see, e.g., 
Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Absent a decision of the Court that ex-
plicitly overrules what we understand to be the holding of Heck . . . we decline to depart from that 
rule.”); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the Supreme 
Court had not squarely held post-Heck that the favorable-termination rule does not apply to de-
fendants no longer in custody, we declined in Gilles to extend the rule of Heck, and likewise de-
cline to extend it here.” (citation omitted)); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[Spencer’s plurality] opinions do not affect our conclusion that Heck applies to Petit’s claims.”);  
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“[W]e decline to announce 
for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.”); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 
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clude that Heck was a restriction on even those without access to habeas cor-
pus from filing a § 1983 damages claim and that reinterpreting Heck based 
upon the Spencer plurality violated clearly set precedent.66 These appellate 
courts maintain that the Spencer plurality did not supersede the Court’s deci-
sion in Heck.67 
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CUT BACK ON THE HECK RULE SO IT 
ONLY APPLIES TO THOSE WITH HABEAS CORPUS ACCESS 
Freedom is a fundamental right of the U.S. Constitution and revoking a 
prisoner’s ability to challenge his conviction in a federal forum goes against 
the objectives of § 1983.68 If the U.S. Supreme Court continues to deny re-
view of the circuit split over the interpretation of its 1994 ruling in Heck v. 
Humphrey, numerous plaintiffs will remain unable to seek relief for unconsti-
tutional imprisonment.69 Furthermore, for purposes of judicial consistency, 
the Court must address this disagreement among the circuits.70 The Court’s 
                                                                                                                           
77, 81 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Court, however, has admonished the lower federal courts to 
follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pronounce-
ment in its subsequent decisions, and to leave the Court ‘the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.’” (citation omitted)); see also Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1315 (discussing the Third Circuit’s 
alignment with the First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits on this question); Powers, 501 F.3d at 602 
(reiterating Cohen’s acknowledgment of the agreement between First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits on interpreting Heck). 
 66 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166; Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81 n.3; see also Powers, 501 
F.3d at 602 (citing Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81) (disagreeing with the viewpoints of the First Circuit 
that it was bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent to apply Heck to plaintiffs without any other 
federal recourse). 
 67 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 167; Randell, 227 F.3d at 301; see also Gilles, 427 F.3d at 
210 (finding that Heck has not been undermined by Spencer). 
 68 See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating § 1983 is meant to give 
plaintiffs a ‘uniquely federal remedy’ against state actors for unconstitutional incursions); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 96-548, at 2 (1979) (discussing congressional intent behind § 1983). 
 69 See Deemer v. Beard (Deemer II), 557 F. App’x 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2014) (Rendell, J., con-
curring) (postulating that released plaintiffs like Deemer will be left without federal recourse ab-
sent § 1983), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 50 (2014); Brief for the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Deemer II, 557 F. App’x 162 (No. 13-
1153) [hereinafter Brief of NACDL] (stating that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Heck will 
“leave a considerable number of individuals without any recourse for a violation of their constitu-
tional rights”); Aaron M. Gallardo, Cohen v. Longshore: Determining Whether the Heck Favora-
ble-Termination Requirement Applies to Plaintiffs Lacking Habeas Corpus Relief Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 725, 729 (2011) (“Strict application of the Heck favorable-
termination requirement would prevent relief to those whose Constitutional rights have been vio-
lated, but without the means for habeas relief.” (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) 
(Souter, J., concurring))). 
 70 See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable Termination 
Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 HARV. L. REV. 868, 875 
(2008) (stating that the divide between the circuits requires the Court to clarify the boundaries of 
the Heck rule); see also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 168 (Rendell, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court’s reconsideration of Heck’s application upon Deemer’s facts will likely lead to a different 
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denial of Deemer’s petition for certiorari implies the Court approves of the 
circuits undermining and ignoring existing precedent.71 The Court must move 
expeditiously to grant certiorari on the issue because in the interim, lower 
courts are—or ought to be—bound by clear precedent that counteracts the 
intended uses of § 1983.72 
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction using 
§ 1983 should not be required to show favorable termination, if, through no 
fault of their own, there is no legal recourse via other state or federal fo-
rums.73 In 1994, in Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court adopted the Heck 
rule to prevent prisoners from challenging their conviction through civil 
means after exhausting their ability to appeal in criminal court.74 There, the 
Court was concerned about potential discrepancies when a plaintiff’s previ-
ous conviction had not been favorably terminated; however, these concerns 
become irrelevant once an inmate was released.75 Despite this, the Heck rule 
still applied to those who were not in state custody and did not have any other 
                                                                                                                           
result); Gallardo, supra note 69, at 726 (referring to the difficult question of applying Heck to 
plaintiffs without habeas remedy). 
 71 See Michelle M. Berry et al., Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the 
Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 
320 (2008) (“A plurality opinion generally cannot overrule prior precedent.” (citing Stanley K. 
Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea—and Constitutional, 27 
U. HAW. L. REV. 331, 347 (2005))); see also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 165, 167 (citations omit-
ted) (referring to seven Courts of Appeals that have used Spencer’s “cobbled-together majority of 
justices” to justify not applying the Heck rule to plaintiffs who do not have any other federal rem-
edy). See generally Deemer v. Beard (Deemer III), 135 S. Ct. 50, 50 (2014) (indicating the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s denial of Deemer’s petition for certiorari). But see Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the 
Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
159, 169 (2009) (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. United States that “a 
fragmented Court . . . . with no single rationale” still sets a binding precedent that “may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds” (quoting 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 72 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-548, at 2 (1979) (referring to the legislature’s intent to provide plain-
tiffs with a federal forum to challenge unconstitutional convictions). 
 73 See Gallardo, supra note 69, at 729 (noting that, although allowing a plaintiff who has no 
other federal forum access to § 1983 might “contravene the core holding of Heck,” it does not 
conflict with the Court’s rationale in Heck); see also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 168 (Rendell, J., 
concurring) (stating that fairness requires a limitation on the Heck rule’s applicability to those 
without habeas corpus remedy and reiterating the importance of this consideration because fair-
ness is an important principle behind § 1983). 
 74 See 512 U.S. 477, 484, 486 (1994). 
 75 See Gallardo, supra note 69, at 729 (arguing that the Court’s concerns in Heck regarding a 
plaintiff receiving contradictory judgments based on two laws does not exist if the prisoner does 
not have access to habeas corpus); see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (stating that § 1983 is not an 
appropriate vehicle to challenge criminal convictions); Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 167 (Rendell, 
J., concurring) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85) (alluding to plaintiffs determined to be lawfully 
imprisoned but also allowed to receive damages via civil litigation for wrongful incarceration). 
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means of receiving federal relief.76 By not explicitly reinterpreting Heck to 
exclude this group of potential plaintiffs, the Court has unfairly denied many 
individuals an opportunity for vindication over violations of their constitu-
tional rights.77 A continuation of this interpretation lets Heck limit § 1983 in a 
way that counteracts its purpose to remedy the state’s unconstitutional in-
fringements.78 
For the reasons detailed above, the Supreme Court must address this cir-
cuit split and should reinterpret Heck to exclude those plaintiffs who are not 
in state custody.79 Nonetheless, until the Court has explicitly done so, rules of 
precedent requires circuit courts to apply the majority interpretation in 
Heck.80 Allowing circuits to reinterpret Supreme Court decisions by piecing 
together concurrences and dissents authorizes the circumvention of set prece-
dent.81 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit correctly concluded in 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Note, supra note 70, at 875 (citing Dible v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp. 2d 807, 820–22 (N.D. 
Iowa 2006)) (stating that circuits have determined because Heck was not overruled by Spencer, it 
applies to all cases where a plaintiff is challenging the validity of a conviction); see also Deemer 
II, 557 F. App’x at 167. State remedies often become moot due to the long-winded review proce-
dures. Brief of NACDL, supra note 69, at 4. Due to timing, most prisoners do not have the oppor-
tunity to file a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 5. Even prisoners who manage to bring habeas corpus 
claims often end up with their cases mooted upon release. Id. at 4–5. 
 77 See Note, supra note 70, at 885–86 (citing Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80–81 (1st Cir. 
1998) (mentioning that even circuits ruling to uphold Heck strictly acknowledge an application of 
the favorable termination requirement in all cases constituted a “fundamental unfairness”); see 
also Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166, 168 (Rendell, J., concurring) (stating that fairness required a 
released prisoner who without habeas corpus relief to be permitted to file for § 1983 damages). 
The plaintiff would have no way of collaterally attacking the state’s criminal conviction via 
§ 1983 post-release. Brief of NACDL, supra note 69, at 5, 14 (citing Peralta v. Vasquez, 476 F.3d 
98, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (referring to the implementation of Heck’s favorable termination as preven-
tative against prisoners using § 1983 instead of a habeas corpus claim to challenge a conviction). 
 78 See Brief of NACDL, supra note 69, at 6. As previously stated, the majority of circuits 
have used this reasoning to adopt the Spencer plurality. E.g., Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 
1316 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Spencer plurality’s interpretation of Heck is “more just and 
more in accordance with the purpose of § 1983); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (stating that § 1983’s 
“high purposes” would be compromised without following the Spencer plurality’s interpretation 
of the Heck rule); Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 
2007) (holding that the circuit courts that adopted Justice Souter’s Heck and Spencer concurrences 
“have the better-reasoned view” and Powers should not be impeded from his §1983 claim when he 
has no other avenue to “federal review of asserted deprivations of federal rights [as a] habeas-
ineligible plaintiff[]”). 
 79 See infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text (outlining the goals of § 1983 and arguing 
that Heck rule should exclude certain plaintiffs to meet those objectives). 
 80 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 166, 168 (Rendell, J., concurring) (citing the seven circuit 
courts that have adopted the Spencer approach); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 
(1997) (“We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of his Court has direct application in a case, yet ap-
pears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should fol-
low the case that directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
 81 See Berry, supra note 71, at 320 (noting that some plurality opinions are “a source of ongo-
ing confusion and uncertainty that seriously undermines our system of precedent”); Linda Novak, 
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Deemer that appellate courts do not have the power to supersede precedent 
established by the Supreme Court. 82 The plurality opinion in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Spencer v. Kemna in 1998 is not enough to overturn the 
clearly established interpretation of the Heck rule.83 Until the Court reinter-
prets the perimeters of Heck, appellate courts do not have the authority to re-
strict the applicability of the Heck rule.84 It is important for the Court to pre-
vent further disregard for the explicit precedent from Heck and address the 
circuit split by creating a limitation on Heck rule.85 
CONCLUSION 
To promote the principles that gave rise to § 1983, plaintiffs should have 
the ability to bring a damages claim when they do not have access to habeas 
relief. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court should have reversed the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Deemer v. Beard in 2014. If the Court continues to ignore 
the circuit split over the interpretation of the Heck v. Humphrey rule, it will be 
allowing circuits violate set precedent. In the interim, lower courts should be 
complying with the binding precedent the Court set in Heck. It is necessary 
for the Court to create an exception to its holding in Heck when a plaintiff has 
no other state or federal remedy.  
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Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 
770–71 (1980) (explaining that when lower courts find it difficult to discern a coherent majority 
rationale, it can lead courts to uphold a combination of two or more minority rationales as authori-
tative); see also Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81 n.3 (requiring lower federal courts to follow “[the Su-
preme Court’s] directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pro-
nouncements in its subsequent decisions”) (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237)). 
 82 See Berry, supra note 71, at 320 (“A plurality opinion generally cannot overrule prior prec-
edent.”). Contra Powers, 501 F.3d at 602 (referring to the reworking of precedent as “rule refin-
ing”). 
 83 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 167 (reiterating that the Spencer plurality did not overturn 
Heck); see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that the Heck rule should 
not apply if a plaintiff has no other access to a federal forum through no fault of his own); id. at 21 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing her agreement with Justice Souter’s viewpoint); id. at 25 
n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (echoing his agreement with Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence).  
 84 See Deemer II, 557 F. App’x at 168 (Rendell, J., concurring). The concurrences and dissents 
in Spencer do not negate Heck’s favorable termination requirement. See id. This is evident because 
Scalia addresses Justice Souter’s concerns by finding that favorable termination is still relevant 
even if a criminal is no longer incarcerated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10. 
 85 See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 267 (stating that courts of appeals do not have directly applicable 
precedent regarding the dilemma of whether to apply Heck when a plaintiff does not have access 
to habeas corpus relief and citing Spencer as potential support for both sides of the circuit split). 
